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I
There  are  many ways  in  which  one  might  characterise  the  divergence
between ›analytical‹ and ›continental‹ approaches to the practice of philo-
sophy, which has been a stubborn feature of European (and North Amer-
ican) intellectual life over the past hundred years or so. But perhaps one of
the most obvious would be to suggest that, whereas the continental tradi-
tion has defended the irreducible status of  the human ›lifeworld‹ against
the intellectual prestige and theoretical influence of  the modern natural
sciences, prominent currents of  analytical philosophy have tended to re-
gard the world of human experience – together with the subject of such
experience – as a kind of irritant, an awkward anomaly. Indeed, analytical
philosophy has expended enormous effort in trying to re-characterize this
world in terms consistent with the ontology and explanatory principles of
the  natural  sciences.  Furthermore, while  many  analytical  philosophers
have deferred in this way to the scientific conception of reality, and have
taken natural science – albeit in an attenuated sense – as their epistemolo-
gical ideal, continental thinkers have regarded their work as requiring a
diagnostic  component.  The  immense  cultural  pressure  exerted  by  the
modern ascendancy of the natural sciences is perceived as having induced
a false understanding of self and world. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, in the
graceful formula which opens his essay L’oeil et l’esprit: »La science mani-
pule les choses, et renonce à les habiter.« (Merleau-Ponty, , p. ) Be-
:
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cause of the power of this manipulation, it is no use countering philosoph-
ical distortions only with better arguments: the socio-historical bases of a
deep alienation must be exposed.
Towards the end of the twentieth century, however, developments in-
ternal to the analytical tradition began to push some of its most eminent
representatives towards a  convergence  with  continental  perspectives. In
particular, a growing realization of the incapacity of scientific naturalism
to account for the inherently conceptual, norm-saturated character of our
experience, even at the most basic sensory level, led to a revival of interest
in Kant, and his idealist successors. This turn was given additional impetus
by a renewal of interest in the work of the American philosopher Wilfrid
Sellars, who had made powerful – but untimely, and therefore largely neg-
lected – criticisms of  mainstream analytical epistemology in the middle
years of the twentieth century. In the case of some distinguished contem-
porary thinkers influenced by Sellars, such as John McDowell, an initial
discontent with the assumptions of  the analytical mainstream has led to
the sketching of a historically diagnostic account of their prevalence. For
example, in his most significant work to date, Mind and World, McDowell
argues  that  the  prestige  of  the  modern  natural  sciences  has  led  us  to
equate nature with the »realm of law,« thereby making it impossible to in-
clude our spontaneity, our responsiveness to reasons, with our conception
of ourselves as natural beings. (See McDowell, , pp. –) To correct
this situation, McDowell urges, we need to follow the lead of Kant in put-
ting spontaneity and rationality back at the centre of our picture of the hu-
man self. But we also need to learn from the critical responses of Kant’s
immediate successors, who argued that Kant’s transcendental framework
leaves the human subject exiled from nature, and out of touch with what,
on Kant’s own criteria, must be regarded as ultimately real.
The problem, then, for McDowell, is that scientific naturalism seems to
leave our cognitive experience of the world – and indeed our moral life –
based on exotic capacities for which no place can be found in the cultur-
ally dominant picture of reality. As he puts it, »when nature threatens to
extrude the space of  reasons, philosophical worries are generated about
the status of rational connections, as something we can be right or wrong
 For Sellars’s classic statement of his views on the nature of perception, and related
issues, see Sellars, .
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about.« (McDowell, , p. ) Hence, in McDowell’s view, we have to res-
ist the »modern conception according to which something’s way of being
natural is its position in the realm of law.« (McDowell, , p. ) Or, to
put the issue in more historical terms, we have to resist the prevalent idea
that the »clear-cut understanding of the realm of law,« which is the great
achievement of  modern science is  simply tantamount to a »new clarity
about nature.« (McDowell, , p. ) Not surprisingly, then, McDowell’s
conviction  of  the  irreversibility  of  Kant’s  achievement, combined  with
deep concern about many of its consequences, sets him on a path which in
some respects retraces that of the post-Kantians of the s. He terms the
broad philosophical approach whose grip he wishes to break »disenchant-
ing naturalism.« (McDowell, , p. ) Breaking its hold will allow us to
see our distinctively human conceptual capacities as a culturally sustained
»second nature,« rather than as separated by a transcendental gulf  from
the natural world – and so under constant suspicion of being metaphysic-
ally disreputable.
II
Numerous critics have expressed dissatisfaction with McDowell’s strategy,
however. And a good proportion of these have highlighted the fact that,
while McDowell wishes to hold onto »naturalism« – in a suitably relaxed
sense – he also insists on the »freedom« and »spontaneity« characteristic
of the »logical space of reasons« (in Sellars’s famous phrase) which human
beings, as self-reflective beings, inhabit. As Christoph Halbig has put the
issue, McDowell’s inclusive gesture raises the question of what holds first
nature and second nature together, what justifies unifying them under the
general heading of »nature.« (Halbig, p. ) For if  the capacity for such
activities as spontaneous reflection, rational justification, and the percep-
tion of moral value are only developed within »second nature,« as McDow-
ell’s favoured image of  »Bildung« suggests, and are therefore implicit in
first nature, this would lead to »an implosion of the category of first nature
which would no longer be coextensive with the rule of  law.« (Halbig, p.
) Halbig’s suggestion is that McDowell would be well-advised to use a
more neutral basic ontological term such as ›reality.‹  But even then, he
would have to acknowledge a »two level structure within reality itself,«
since certain of the objective features with which McDowell endows the
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world, such as moral value, are not locatable within nature, as naturalism
understands it. (Halbig, p. )
However, the critical response to McDowell on which I intend to focus
here, and which urges similar objections, is that of another prominent rep-
resentative of the ›post-analytical‹ trend in contemporary Anglo-Americ-
an philosophy. It might be said that Robert Pippin’s intellectual itinerary
has led him to concerns similar to those of  McDowell, but that he has
reached them from the opposite direction, as it were. Beginning from an
initial  in Kant  and the  post-Kantian idealists, especially  Hegel, Pippin’s
thinking has expanded into a critique of  currents in European thought
over the last two centuries that seek to demote or even eliminate human
subjectivity,  and  along  with  it  the  modern  ideals  of  freedom  and
autonomy. This, of course, sounds reminiscent of McDowell. But whereas
McDowell’s prime concern is to combat the scientism of analytical philo-
sophy, Pippin’s target, in his more historically and culturally oriented writ-
ings, is the threat to subjectivity stemming from the deconstructive and
post-modern currents of continental thought. (See Pippin, )
This difference of target – postmodernism on the one hand, scientism
on the other – is connected with an important divergence from McDowell
over  how  best  to  repel  threats  to  our  understanding  of  ourselves  as
creatures responsive to reasons. In Mind and World, McDowell argues that
Kant made crucial advances in accounting for the way in which thought
bears on reality. After Kant it is no longer possible to ignore the fact that
conceptual  articulation  is  displayed  by  all  experience  of  an  objective
world, even when we seem to be simply registering what is before us; we
must  cease  to  imagine  that  raw pre-conceptual  inputs  could somehow
function as reasons for our beliefs about the world, as opposed to merely
»exculpating« them. But, at the same time, Kant did not go far enough.
»Kant’s successors,« McDowell suggests approvingly, »definitively abandon
the idea that our sensibility has its own autonomous a priori form, and the
sharp boundary Kant places between understanding, constrained by sens-
ibility, and unconstrained reason.« (McDowell, , p. ) In his view,
this move represents a shift towards his own style of »relaxed naturalism,«
or »naturalised Platonism.«
For Pippin, however, this  is  a misunderstanding of  the post-Kantian
dynamic. His own response to the complex of issues regarding the relation
of reason and nature is to cut the Gordian knot. He implies that there is no
problem in opposing the spontaneity of thought to a nature structured by
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causal laws, as long as we do not construe this opposition as an ontological
dualism. The ›space of reasons‹ is not locked in metaphysical rivalry with
the ›space of causes,‹ for it is a purely normative space, to which all scien-
tifically explanatory considerations are irrelevant (although, of course, it is
brought into being by the practices of natural creatures). Consequently, in
the epistemological domain, Pippin rejects what he takes to be McDowell’s
notion that the world, insofar as it is simply received in perception, could
function as a source of legitimation for our judgements. And in the prac-
tical domain, he denies what he takes to be McDowell’s proposal that the
notion  of  the  actualization  of  natural  human  capacities  could  provide
some kind of ethical guideline (See Pippin, , pp. –). On Pippin’s
account, in  the  aftermath  of  Kant, perception always  involves  »actively
[…] discriminating,« not just a passive registration of the deliverances of
the senses, just as the question of ethical normativity is a question of how
there could be »a common mindedness such that our reactions to conduct
that is objectionable have become so intimate and such a part of that fab-
ric  [of  a  form of  life]  that  the conduct  being the  sort  of  conduct  it  is
counts thereby as reason enough to condemn it.« (Pippin, , p. ) In
general, Pippin contends, »the relevant image for our »always already en-
gaged« conceptual and practical capacities in the German idealist tradi-
tion  is  legislative  power,  not  empirical  discrimination  and  deliberative
judgement« (Pippin, , p. ). For him, »the space of reasons, as a his-
torically constituted human practice, is autonomous,  sui generis, not ex-
plicable in first-nature terms, not supernatural« (Pippin, , p. ). The
threat of scientific naturalism does not need to be warded off by dubious,
regressive challenges to the modern notion of nature as the realm of law.
We can rest easy in the assurance that naturalism will never find a way of
capturing, in its own language, what occurs in the space of  reasons. So,
whereas McDowell fears that the »extrusion« of the space of reasons from
nature will result in its dismissal as nugatory, Pippin suggests, on the con-
trary,  that  it  is  precisely  this  extrusion  which  guarantees  its  radical
autonomy.
III
Of  prime  interest  to  us, in  this  context, is  the  role  played  by  Fichte’s
thought in bolstering Pippin’s conviction that we can leave scientific nat-
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uralism to its own sorry devices, without fearing any threat to the space of
reasons. In  his  second  major  discussion  of  Fichte, which  appeared  as
chapter three of Hegel’s Idealism, Pippin contends that Fichte’s decisive ad-
vance over Kant was to overcome latter’s ambiguous clinging to the notion
that there is purely sensory component of experience, consisting of pass-
ively registered inputs having an unknowable ground. Pippin wrote:
Fichte essentially combines the explicit Kantian thesis about the cent-
rality  of  judgement in experience […] with the more implicit  and un-
developed Kantian claim that such judgements are apperceptive and spon-
taneous […] Fichte thought it a necessary consequence of his own account
of transcendental apperception that what Kant would regard as the mani-
fold of  intuitions given in experience should indeed be understood as a
limitation on the subject’s activity, but a limitation again taken or posited
to be such a limitation by a subject. (Pippin, , p. )
At the same time, Pippin is keen to downplay any suggestion that, for
Fichte, objects are reducible to rule-governed representations produced by
a transcendental subject. Rather, he asserts, »Fichte is explaining the con-
sequences of the claim that  representing an object is something that I reflex-
ively  do, that it is a relation I must  establish, and he is impressed by the fact
that such an activity must be spontaneous, ultimately determined by the sub-
ject, if  the  representing is  an epistemic  and not  a  matter-of-fact  relation.«
(Pippin, , p. ) In line with this interpretation, Pippin argues that the
primary target of Fichte’s relentless attacks on ›dogmatism‹ is not realism,
but rather ›naturalism:‹ the self-positing of the ›I‹ occurs in a dimension
which has no overlap with the domain of natural being.
Pippin’s next major engagement of Fichte, his essay on Fichte’s Alleged
One-Sided, Subjective, Psychological Idealism, was published around a dec-
ade after Hegel’s Idealism, and shows the influence of the resurgent Sellar-
sian vocabulary. The points about the role of the apperceptive spontaneity
of the ›I‹ in all perception which Pippin had made in his book on Hegel
are now presented in new language. Fichte, Pippin affirms, does not need
to defend what he labels »the metaphysical distinctness of  spontaneous
mind.« (Pippin,  a, p. ) Rather, »Fichte’s idealism […] asserts the
self-sufficiency or autonomy of, let us say, the normative domain itself, what
Sellars took to calling (without actually thinking through as radically as
Fichte did the implications of such an autonomy claim) ›the space of reas-
ons‹« (Pippin,  a, p. ). In this essay, Pippin also reaffirms his oppos-
ition to any general view of Fichte which would present him as attempting
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to combine a strategy for overcoming Kantian dualisms with a radicalisa-
tion of  Kantian  autonomy, to  achieve  –  in  the  slogan of  the  time –  a
›Spinozism of freedom.‹ As he writes, »If there is a ›monism‹ emerging in
the post-Kantian philosophical world, of the kind proposed by Fichte (and
that decisively influenced Hegel) it is what might be called a normative
monism, a claim for the ›absolute‹ or unconditioned status of the space of
reasons.« (Pippin,  a, p. )
As this statement suggests, Pippin tends to portray Hegel’s thought as
the culmination of the positive line of development that flows from Kant
via Fichte. Hegel’s achievement is said to consist in reformulating the Kan-
tian process of  self-legislation, as a collective, historical, and continually
revisable activity. This means that there is no more place for a normative
role for nature in Hegel’s thought than in Fichte’s: nature is simply what
spirit increasingly detaches itself from – and rightly so. Indeed, for Pippin,
this process of  detachment, or ›extrusion‹ (to use McDowell’s  word), is
what the development of Spirit essentially consists in. (See Pippin, ,
pp. –)
Undoubtedly, the thought of Fichte’s Jena period displays many features
that support such an interpretation. Most obviously, there is Fichte’s tend-
ency to contrast ›freedom,‹ on the one hand, and ›being‹ on the other. In
the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, for example, he declares that »Free-
dom is, accordingly, the highest ground and the first CONDITION of all being
and all consciousness.« (Fichte, WL nm, § ). This implies that the subject,
as pure ›agility,‹ has no ontological status, and hence that there can be no
metaphysical rivalry between being and subjectivity. Of course, the mes-
sage that Pippin takes from Fichte is only that subjectivity is immune to
attempts at naturalistic reduction. He might concede that freedom is the
ground and condition of all consciousness, but certainly not of all being.
But we should note that even Fichte’s much stronger transcendentalism
soon proved unable to offer a stable solution to the problem of the relation
between being and freedom, nature and subjectivity, when this problem
was considered from a moral or practical point of  view. For without the
conviction that normative ideals can – at least, in the very long run – be
realized, embodied in being, then the demands they place upon us are
 For an ambitious interpretation of  the  Phenomenology of  Spirit  along these lines,
see Pinkard, .
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likely to be rejected as futile and vain. Fichte’s ›turn‹ away from his Jena
transcendental  philosophy, on which the seal  is  set  by  The Vocation of
Man (), occurs when the existential problem raised by the deep dis-
crepancy between (natural) being and (practical) normativity, between the
›space of law‹ and the ›space of reasons,‹ moves to the centre of his con-
cerns. As he writes: »But is my intention always fulfilled? Does it take no
more than to will the best in order to make it happen? Oh, most good res-
olutions are completely lost for this world, and others seem to work even
against the purpose one had in mind for them. On the other hand, people’s
most despicable passions, their vices, and their misdeeds very often bring
about the better more surely than the efforts of the righteous person, who
never wants to do evil so that good may result from it.« (Fichte, BM, p. ,
VM, p. )
Fichte’s response to this problem is the invocation of a ›faith‹ (Glaube)
implicit in our moral response to others (which means, simply in our re-
sponse to them as  other subjects). Moral commitment exemplifies – and
displays implicit confidence in – the working of an all-pervasive ›universal
will,‹ which guides nature and practical reason towards their ultimate con-
vergence. (Fichte, BM, pp. –, VM, p. –)
IV
One tempting response to the theme of ›rational faith,‹ which Fichte in-
herits from Kant, vastly extending its scope in the process, might be to dis-
miss it as an indication of the lingering grip of Christianity on the philo-
sophical imagination of  the Idealists.  Yet this problematic cannot be so
readily dismissed, as may become clearer if we compare Pippin’s approach
to the problem of nature and the normative with the Marburg neo-Kan-
tianism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as exemplified
by Heinrich Rickert. The comparison suggests itself because, for the neo-
Kantians too, the exaggerated claims of metaphysical speculation could be
undercut by assigning a sui generis status to the normative (or, in the older
language, to the sphere of ›value‹). At the same time, the neo-Kantians –
like contemporary ›post-Sellarsians‹ – could not return naively to Kant’s
way of distinguishing between different branches of reason, since they had
the whole history of post-Kantian developments in view. The validity of at
least some of the impulses behind post-Kantian developments had to be
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acknowledged. And indeed, Rickert’s general rubric for his project, Kritik
des Kritizismus, (Rickert, , p. ) would not be an inaccurate descrip-
tion of post-Sellarsian endeavours.
In his centenary article on the  Atheismusstreit, for example, published
in Kant-Studien in , Rickert proposed an interpretation of the Fichte
of the late s which foreshadows the recent Sellarsian emphasis on the
normative structure, not just of moral consciousness, but of all cognition.
For Fichte, Rickert explains, all theoretical knowledge – as well as moral
commitment – is ultimately grounded in a feeling of certainty that cannot
be derived from anything more ultimate. But this feeling is not simply a
psychological state which may occur or fail to occur: it is an achievement
of my orientation towards, my striving for truth, which is itself a moral ob-
ligation.  As  Rickert  comments,  in  elucidating  Fichte’s  fundamental
thought: »All conviction is practical. ›I ought to convince myself‹. Without
the will to conviction nothing is true and certain for me. Every judgement
which makes a  claim to truth presupposes the will  to  truth as the last
ground of  certainty. An ethical  willing in  the  broadest  sense, a  willing
which acknowledges the ›ought‹, is the basis not only for the ethical, but
for the theoretical, thinking person.« (Rickert, , p. )
Like the contemporary thinkers we have been considering, Rickert re-
gards Fichte’s move towards the unqualified primacy of practical reason as
making possible  the overcoming of  the »old-fashioned doctrine of  two
worlds« (alte Zweiweltenlehre) which – although diluted by Kant – could
not be entirely given up by him, since it played an essential role in his
practical philosophy. As Rickert writes, »Fichte, by contrast, abandoned the
split in being (Seinsspaltung) in every respect, so that his thinking which
previously and subsequently went through transformations, is, at the time
of the atheism controversy, antimetaphysical, even positivistic, if you will.«
(Rickert, , p. )
Fichte’s breakthrough, in this account, consists in avoiding all specula-
tion, in limiting himself  to the evidence of  inner and outer experience.
Furthermore, his overcoming of  what Rickert  terms »intellectualism« –
the  false  notion  that  cognition  can operate  independently  of  ›will‹  (or
›normative commitment,‹ we might say) – is declared to be the basis for a
neutralization of the threat of naturalism. Rickert does not spell out this
argument in any detail in the Atheismusstreit essay, but he seems to have in
mind considerations similar to those advanced by Pippin: knowing is not
just passive reception, but involves an active taking up, always structured
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by in relation to norms of justification. And because this taking up must
be free or spontaneous in order for the question of justification to arise at
all, it cannot be accounted for in causal terms.
Yet Rickert also stresses in this relatively early essay that – for Fichte –
the lack of correspondence between the value-oriented striving of the self
and the apparent functioning of the world raises a profound problem of
rationality, and hence of existential meaning. Fichte himself, reflecting on
the Atheismusstreit, wrote: »if you were merely and simply will […] then
you might will in an ethical manner, and everything would be concluded
[…] But you are also knowledge […] and when you consider your willing,
it will appear to you as contrary to reason (vernunftwidrig) when it ap-
pears pointless and without consequence.« (Fichte, PS, p. )
As beings capable of rational willing, we are both authors and subjects
of a moral law which commands absolutely. But, as finite, natural beings
we cannot  help  regarding our  willing  from the  standpoint  of  purpose.
Thus the question of the possibility of the  realisation of  morality, which
for Fichte is tantamount to the realisation of freedom, cannot be excluded
from the assessment of  the  meaningfulness  of morality. And, as we have
seen, for Fichte this has the consequence that moral willing is inherently
an expression of faith in an ultimate moral world order – or, better, a mor-
al world ordering (an ordo ordinans, which becomes the ›universal will‹ of
The Vocation of Man). Specific convictions about God and his nature are
symbolic  elaborations  of  this  fundamental  –  not  even necessarily  con-
scious – faith, which defines the existential space of religious belief.
This pattern of argument, drawing on the post-Kantian trajectory, re-
mains  constant  throughout  Rickert’s  career. In  the  Systematische  Selb-
stdarstellung which he published in , two years before his death, he
proposes, in a similar way, that »it cannot be enough for a human being to
allow his free will to be determined by values and act accordingly, when he
does not at the same time believe that his acting and willing in the world is
also accompanied by real  consequences, which correspond to the values
which he wills« (Rickert, , p. ). In other words, human striving
cannot be satisfied unless we are able to anticipate the overcoming of the
separation of the practical and the theoretical what Rickert terms a »unity
 For further considerations on Fichte along these lines, see Rickert, , ch. , pp.
–.
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of value and reality« – a »Wertwirklichkeit«. But since this »value-reality«
refers to a future that lies beyond our control, it cannot be regarded as an
objective reality which could be known. As Rickert puts it, »If we wish to
establish a positive attitude to the problems of value-reality there remains
no other recourse than to step beyond the bounds of knowledge.« (Rickert,
, p. ) And it is here that the imagery and symbolism of  religion
come into their own: »We believe in a metaphysical mode of being, but re-
ject any scientific investigation of this way of being.« (Rickert, , p. )
Rickert’s  thinking, I  would like to suggest, can help us in evaluating
Pippin’s solution to the problem of  nature and subjectivity. For Rickert,
too, is committed to cleansing Kantianism of its dualistic implications (a
commitment which stimulates his powerful interest in Fichte). While he
insists on the plurality of modes of being, he also argues that this multipli-
city need not be expressed in terms of a Kantian contrast between appear-
ances and things-in-themselves. The experienced world is  composed of
the two discrete modes of  »perceivable, sensory« and »intelligible, non-
sensory« being – it includes both what is apprehended through the senses
and culturally consolidated structures of  meaning. But furthermore, the
world of  experience  as  a  whole  presupposes  an experiencer  –  or  what
Rickert terms a »pro-physical subject (prophysisches Subjekt), which can
never be thought as an object,« and which may »never be accounted onto-
logically as part of what is (niemals ontologisch zu dem Seienden gerechnet
werden dürfte).« (Rickert, , p. ) Like the post-Sellarsians in general,
Rickert insists that the defining feature of this subject is its responsiveness
to the normative: its capacity to take up an active stance, whether positive
or negative, towards values, both in the practical and in the theoretical
sphere. But like Pippin in particular, he does not think the acknowledge-
ment of such a subject commits us to the existence of some supernatural
entity: the characterization ›pro-physical‹  is clearly intended to contrast
with ›metaphysical.‹ Rickert argues that the Kantian dualism of  appear-
ance and thing-in-itself is now replaced with a contrast between »objecti-
fiable and non-objectifiable spheres of  being,« but both these spheres of
being belong in the »here-and-now« (Diesseits). And, in a move which an-
ticipates Pippin’s take on the »virtuous« line of development of post-Kan-
tian idealism, from individual to historical and collective self-legislation,
he  suggests  that  »if  we  wish  to  hold  onto  Kant’s  ethical  principle  of
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autonomy, we must presuppose the we-community as a totality of  free,
non-objectifiable subjects.« (Rickert, , p. )
But as we have just noted, Rickert does not assume that, once we have
established the irreducibility of  the subjective, our philosophical travails
are at an end. Naturalism may have been shown to be toothless, but the
question of  how to make sense of  the thought of  a  sui generis  space of
reasons becoming effective, being actually embodied in the law-governed
natural world still remains. It might perhaps be replied that Pippin’s ver-
sion of Hegelianism already provides an answer to this question: the space
of  reasons  is  the  space  of  those  patterns  of  intersubjective  recognition
which sustain a functioning form of socio-historical life; and the structure
of this space can be viewed as evolving over time, through a series of in-
ternally  driven  dialectical  shifts,  towards  a  relatively  stable  balance  of
autonomy and dependency. Pippin himself, sensibly enough, propounds
an interpretation of Hegel that offers no guarantee of such progress; Hegel,
he insists, does not seek to provide us with a »logico-metaphysical, contin-
gency devouring Wissenschaft machine,« as he has so often been accused
of  doing. (Pippin, , p. ) But if  one adopts this view, while at the
same time arguing that we can delineate at least the basic structure of a ra-
tional, collectively autonomous form of  social and cultural life, then the
question of  the meaningfulness of  our obligation to strive towards this
form of  life – which history will  not generate automatically – becomes
hard to ignore.
Rickert’s neo-Kantian equivalent for the »Wissenschaft  machine« is a
»theoreticism or  logicism« which  finds  contradictions  everywhere, and
which »reinterprets the positive other in intellectualistic terms as some-
thing logically Negative.« (Rickert, , p. ) But at the same time, Rick-
ert turns out to be rather sympathetic to the tripartite Hegelian distinction
of ›subjective,‹ ›objective‹ and ›absolute‹ spirit. For he finds place for the
notion of ›absolute spirit,‹ as Hegel’s attempt to answer the question of the
ultimate  significance  of  our  normative  commitments:  »subjective  spirit
signifies the free act of the pro-physical subject, through which it takes up
a stance towards values. Objective spirit embraces the mundus intelligiblis,
in other words, the totality of  all comprehensible meaning-structures in
 Of course, Rickert interprets our autonomy as our ability to regulate our activity in
accordance with freely accepted values, and in this respect is close to McDowell’s
moral realism than the more radical version of self-legislation defended by Pippin.
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the here and now […] Absolute spirit, by contrast, lies beyond all experi-
ence and all science. It is the ›value-reality‹ in which we must have faith, if
our taking up of a position, determined by values, is also to have a mean-
ing from the standpoint of its consequences in the world.« (Rickert, ,
pp. –)
By contrast, Pippin – not distinguishing between ›objective‹ and ›abso-
lute‹ spirit – suggests that »spirit is a self-imposed norm, a self-legislated
realm that we institute and sustain, that exists only by being instituted and
sustained.« (Pippin,  b, p. ) As this characteristic formula reveals,
Pippin’s interpretation downplays the extent to which the instituting »we is
always already shaped by spirit, so  that  spirit’s  normative demands are
more  than  just  the  ›selfimposed‹  demands  (in  some  quasivoluntaristic
sense) of  the community which experiences them. Once or twice, in the
›Postscript‹  to his original critique of  McDowell, Pippin alludes to »the
very difficult question of the status of the requirement that we act as the
free beings that we are.« (Pippin, , p. ) But he shows no inclination
to pursue the question, either in terms of the source of the requirement or
of its existential coherence – and this is perhaps not surprising. For he af-
firms that »Hegel has proposed a conception of rationality […] that is es-
sentially  social and historical, rather than rule governed, or only ideally
communal, or social and historical ›in application‹ only.« (Pippin, , p.
) Yet if this reading of Hegel were accurate, and if freedom and ration-
ality are as closely intertwined as Pippin rightly assumes, then were we not
to act like free beings, we would not in fact be free beings, and there would
be nothing beyond our existing practices to generate the demand that we
should become free.
To put this in another way: to accept the normative demands of any in-
stituted set of  practices, we need to have confidence – however implicit
and inarticulate  –  that  these  practices  are  a  piece  of  ›existing  reason.‹
Either word in Hegel’s phrase, existierende Vernunft, can bear the emphas-
is. For it implies both that our practices, while obviously the result of the
course that history has taken, express a non-contingent rational content,
and that there is always more to reason than its specific enactments, a sur-
plus which exerts a practical pressure on us. For the majority of  human
beings, in Hegel’s view, this confidence is expressed through their religious
consciousness; and Hegel shows few inhibitions about using religious lan-
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guage, in appropriate contexts, in order to articulate it. To put the point
from another angle, Pippin’s interpretation fails to register that the human
instituting and sustaining of ›spirit‹ as the ›space of reasons‹ is, for Hegel,
answerable to the rationality of  spirit  in an absolute sense (the rational
process need not always coincide with the historical one, although we must
generally trust that it does). Hence it leaves us with a deficient criterion for
assessing the ethical and political adequacy of  any particular social em-
bodiment of reason, compared with another. As Alan Patten has pointed
out, in his critique of Pippin: »there is a gap in the argument between the
thin sense of community involved in recognizing that all reasons are ulti-
mately  social  and historical  in  character  (even the  most  individualistic
libertarian could concede this) and the thick sense of community affirmed
by Hegel« (Patten, , pp. –).
In view of these difficulties, it may be helpful to conclude by returning
to McDowell’s side of the argument. For it is clear that McDowell is willing
to entertain the thought of a convergence between the objective and the
subjective, between nature and the normative, which Pippin resists, and
indeed is happy to acknowledge this thought as Hegel’s signal contribu-
tion. In the sequel to his original debate with Pippin, McDowell defends
the claim that »capacities that belong to our spontaneity […] are actual-
ized in intuitions« (McDowell, , p. ) with a direct appeal to Hegel:
»The self-realization of  the Concept is the unfolding of  thought, and as
such subjective. But it is equally the self-revelation of reality, and as such
objective.« (McDowell, , p. ) Similarly, McDowell’s essays in prac-
tical philosophy seem to imply that any up-and-running social world must
be in some sense a self-revelation of the ethical, into which we need only
to be appropriately inducted. Indeed, from the standpoint we have now
reached, McDowell’s »relaxed naturalism« can be seen as gesturing in the
direction of that Wertwirklichkeit which Rickert portrays as the transcend-
ent end-point of human aspiration. But at the same time, McDowell seems
pay for these intimations of consonance with his quietism – his suspicion
 A classical example is, of course, Hegel’s ›Introduction’ to his Lectures on the Philo-
sophy of World History (Hegel, , pp. –). One of the drawbacks of Pippin’s
interpretation of Hegel, which makes an historically expanding sense of answerab-
ility for our practices take all the strain, is that it is unable to offer a coherent ac-
count of the role Hegel allots to religion.
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of any teleological conception of history, however modest, and his rejec-
tion of the idea that there might be »a method, a formally describable pro-
cedure, for improving our ethical thinking.« (McDowell, , p. ) So,
in a manner contrary to that of  Pippin, McDowell  also ends by falling
short  of  the  equilibrium which  was  so  important  to  the  post-Kantian
Idealists – one in which an indispensable sense of fulfilment, of meaning-
ful participation in social and historical existence, is balanced against the
distress of the unfulfilled moral-political goal.
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